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OPINION
By Suntou Touray
A friend last night asked me to reflect on the APRC statement issue made by Hon. Ousainou Darboe.
At its core, the question is simple: was the political rupture about APRC as a party, or about control and influence? As is often the case in political breakups, each side tells a story that favours its own position. But context matters.
In early 2017, following the fall of Yahya Jammeh, many APRC loyalists, particularly those at the grassroots found themselves politically displaced. In times of uncertainty, it is the poor and vulnerable who feels the greatest anxiety. Elites, by contrast, tend to adapt quickly, often repositioning themselves to maintain relevance and influence. During this period, Hon. Ousainou Darboe, Secretary General of the UDP and Foreign Minister, adopted an open-door policy approach. He welcomed individuals from the former ruling party, including prominent figures led by Hon. Abdoulie Suku Singhateh. Notable women, such as Yaye Compins, also joined the UDP.
In fact, the 2017 National Assembly campaign was partially entrusted in the hands of Hon Suku Singhateh, former APRC NAM during the tour, which was headed by Hon Ousainou himself.
This gesture was, at the time, a goodwill posture and indicated that he accepted the newcomers with open arms. Although it angered longtime UDP leaders on tour, Suku oversaw the campaign process whilst Hon Darboe left the tour to attend to an important mission abroad.
This influx, however, was not without tension. Sections of the UDP base, particularly among its women’s leadership viewed the newcomers with suspicion and resentment. Some questioned how those who had benefited under Jammeh’s rule could now partake in what they saw as the fruits of UDP’s struggle.
Darboe’s response was instructive. In a recorded message intended for a UDP conference in Paris, which he could not attend, he cautioned supporters against excluding former APRC members. His position suggested a strategic distinction: he was willing to absorb individuals of influence, but not necessarily embrace APRC as a unified political entity.
Meanwhile, President Adama Barrow faced a different calculation. His political footing, particularly within a UDP-dominated structure, may not have offered the security he desired. In response, he gradually built an alternative base first through the Barrow Youth Movement, and eventually through the formation of the NPP. At that stage, APRC was politically weakened, even struggling at times to maintain internal cohesion. Yet rather than allowing it to fade into irrelevance, Barrow’s later alliance with APRC effectively revived it, granting the party renewed significance in the country’s political landscape. In hindsight, this move was consequential. If President Barrow takes on a ruthless political streak, the APRC, as a party, would be rendered politically very weak.
Ultimately, the fracture between Darboe and Barrow cannot be reduced to a single issue. It reflects a convergence of competing interests, strategic positioning, control of political machinery, and unresolved disagreements over power-sharing and ultimately power transfer arrangements. In Gambian politics, as elsewhere, alliances are rarely just about ideology. They are, more often, about survival, influence, and the careful management of power.
APRC as a unit does not want to be dead. Hon Darboe’s Strategy was to render the APRC party irrelevant without using the law or force to do so. Absorbs its members and suffocates the party whose machinery he deemed should be rendered insignificant in Gambian politics.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect The Fatu Network’s editorial stance.
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